Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Four Dimensionalism, Philosophy: The so-called four-dimensionalism is represented by a coordinate system with three space axes and one time axis. The coordinate system represents events by a point, indicating position in space and point in time. Perpetual objects are represented by extended lines. The path of these lines correspond to the object’s changes in space. The thickness of these lines corresponds to the size of the object. By way of cross sections of these world lines (objects and their passage of time), the so-called time slices, the momentary state of the objects can be found. The time slice of a person is not flat, but identical with the person in a moment. See also coordinate system, image, representation, space-time, time, space, change, motion, reference systems._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Four-Dimensionalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 25 Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: The time operator shifts the range: E.g., „In 1642 there were no cuckoo clocks“ is like e.g., „there are no cuckoo clocks in Australia“. The sentence about 1642 is true if there are no cuckoo clocks in this area (part of reality). Intrinsic change/time/four-dimensionalism: Problem: e.g., I make the sentence true: "Last night there was someone in my bed" but I am sitting here at the table. Cf. >Truth maker/Lewis. Schwarz I 26 Intuitive Answer: (some representatives): Having slept last night is not at all incompatible with being awake now. The things seem to instantiate only incompatible properties, these are in reality merely time-relative. Objects about which we quantify with "last night" are in themselves neither sleeping nor sitting nor anything else. They also have neither shape nor color. Correct: you are "awake at t" etc. Properties: According to this view, simple properties are actually relations between strangely featureless things and times. Cf. >Properties/Lewis. Time-relative properties/LewisVs: This is unacceptable. Form/Lewis: A form is a property and not a relation! Properties, intrinsic/SchwarzVsLewis: Lewis misstated the problem; it is not about intrinsic properties, but about single-digit properties. Properties/Relation: Question: Whether form predicates express disguised relations similar to e.g. "famous" and "far". It is meaningless to say someone is famous without reference to anything. Lewis: But I guess it makes sense without reference to anything else to say something is red or round. Intrinsic change/Lewis: Lösung: Solution: According to the analogy of time and space: e.g., a long wall is high and red in some places, low and gray in others. As a whole, it is neither high nor low, neither red nor gray. Solution: It is simply composed of different parts. Schwarz I 27 Change/Lewis: Ordinary things have different properties at different times by being composed of parts with those properties. >Change/Lewis. Identity/time/temporal identity/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: Then past things are not strictly identical with present things. The thing that used to be asleep and the thing that is sitting here now are not strictly identical. The different temporal parts are different things after all.(1976b(1) >Temporal Identity. MellorVsLewis:That is absurd. When we talk about someone, we are not talking about his parts. LewisVsVs: E.g., surely the whole man was Hillary on Mt. Everest. Solution: Hillary has a past temporal part that is on a past part of Everest. Edmund Hillary as a whole meets this condition. Problem: E.g., Then I am strictly speaking as a whole neither waking nor sitting. But as a whole I am not formless because of that. Lewis/Solution: I have a complex four-dimensional form. There are always temporal parts which are ignored. I/Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: "I" often refers only to a single temporal part of me. Ted Sider: (1996(3), 2001a(4), 188-208): Ted Sider elaborated: Names always refer to temporal parts. I tonight was a temporal counterpart of me now. 1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. In [Lewis 1986f]. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. 4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Four-Dimensionalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28